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ABSTRACT
The Court of Appeal in England and Wales held (R. v. Sardar, 2012)
there had been no exceptional circumstances that justiﬁed a jury
retiring with a transcript of the complainant’s interview. This paper
reports an investigation into the impact multiple evidence forms
and use of a judicial warning has on juror evaluations of a witness.
The warning focuses juror attention on placing disproportionate
weight on the evidence as opposed to their general impression of
it. Sixty jury-eligible participants were presented with witness
evidence in transcript, video, or transcript plus video format. Half
the participants in each condition received the warning. All mock
jurors completed a questionnaire which assessed perceptions of
witness and task. Outcomes showed that transcript plus video
evidence, when accompanied by a warning, did impact on mock
jurors’ global assessments of the witness. The warning made the
task less clear for jurors and, in the video condition, led to higher
ratings of how satisfactory and reliable the witness was. Findings
support the provision of a judicial warning to jurors and show
some initial support for judiciary opposition to the provision of an
additional transcript only when jurors are asked to make the more
usual global witness assessments.
KEYWORDS
Evidence; judicial warning;
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A rape conviction was deemed unsafe in the case of R. v. Sardar (2012) in England
and Wales as the jury had, without good reason, been provided with a transcript of
the complainant’s video evidence-in-chief and, in addition, were permitted to keep it
during deliberations. In this jurisdiction, complainant video evidence is captured by
Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) procedures (i.e., at police interview) and can then be
used as evidence in chief during trial. In addition, jurors were not warned of the risks
of placing disproportionate weight on the transcript rather than forming an impression
of the witness. The Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecution had likely gained
an unfair advantage. The case of Sardar was guided by previous rulings that estab-
lished transcripts of video evidence could only be used if they assisted jurors to follow
the evidence, for example, if a witness has a strong accent or the audio quality was
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poor.1 Moreover, any evidence should be accompanied by a judicial warning (R. v.
Welstead, 1995; R. v. Popescu, 2010).
It is apparent this ruling was motivated by two key concerns; ﬁrst, that transcript evidence
will be given greater consideration than other trial evidence, and second, that jurors will
focus heavily on a transcript rather than evaluating the witness more generally (i.e., globally).
Speciﬁc witness attributes are those which are not considered global, for example, how accu-
rate, conﬁdent or intelligent the witness might be. The latter point is of interest given that
multimedia learning researchers have raised similar concerns arguing that individuals are
more likely to attend to text than accompanying graphics (Clark & Mayer, 2011). Such asser-
tions nevertheless lack empirical support, particularly as applied to the courtroom, since no
research has investigated whether simultaneously presenting jurors with multiple forms of
evidence has an effect on information-processes and thereby juror evaluations. Similarly,
there is at present, a minimal amount of empirical evidence to suggest that the provision of
a judicial warning is a safeguard against bias.
Against this backdrop, the present study aimed to examine the effects of multiple forms of
evidence and judicial warning on juror perceptions of witness testimony. We outline the
method employed in the study below but turn our attention ﬁrst to judicial warnings. Given
the universal use of warnings in legal contexts it is essential to consider whether warnings, as
used in legal cases, are an adequate safeguard against bias.
Despite an entrenched belief that judicial warnings are a successful method of educating
jurors (Coyle & Thomson, 2014) research has returned mixed results. First, several studies
have demonstrated that warnings encourage juror caution, as warnings about the reliability
of eyewitness testimony results in fewer guilty verdicts (Greene, 1988; Katzev & Wishart,
1985; Paterson, Anderson, & Kemp, 2013). Moreover, research shows that warnings can mit-
igate bias, including bias caused by the emotional expression of a witness or incorrect beliefs
about nonverbal indicators of deception (Bollingmo, Wessel, Sandvold, Eilertsen, & Magnus-
sen, 2009; Coyle & Thomson). These ﬁndings suggest that warnings can enhance juror per-
formance and are an effective means of directing attention to appropriate factors for
consideration. It is of particular relevance for the case in point that warnings may affect the
extent to which jurors focus on witness demeanor.
In contrast, other researchers have reported that witness testimony warnings had no
impact on verdicts or credibility ratings of a witness (Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1990; Niko-
nova & Ogloff, 2005). In addition, judicial warnings have been shown to be ineffective
against hindsight bias and coercion bias (Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; Kassin & Wrightsman,
1981; Smith & Greene, 2005). Taken together this indicates the efﬁcacy of judicial instruc-
tions varies and may not always assist in the prevention of bias. Moreover, comprehension
rates of jury instructions are often found to be low (Rose & Ogloff, 2001). More recent
research for example has shown that even when most jurors report they comprehend judicial
instructions only a small minority actually demonstrates a full understanding of those
1See also Minnesota State Bar Association General Rule 1: Transcripts of audio recordings played during trial may be pro-
vided to the jury to help them understand what is said in the recording. The decision to furnish jurors with copies of a tran-
script to assist them in listening to the audio recording is subject to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The need to
provide transcripts to the jury during audio playback is generally caused by two circumstances: (1) inability to understand a
portion of the tape under the circumstances in which it will be replayed; and (2) the need to identify the speakers, especially
if two or more persons talk at the same time (the Hon. Alan Pendleton, see http://mnbenchbar.com/2015/07/using-tran-
scripts-of-audio-recordings-during-trial/ accessed September 6, 2016.
248 J. M. WHEATCROFT AND H. KEOGAN
instructions (Thomas, 2010). It is thus unclear from existing research whether a judicial
warning will be successful in preventing bias, though it may encourage jurors to make more
cautious ratings of the witness.
The warning element is only one part of the story. Psychological perspectives relevant to
information processing and cognition can also help to explain why when humans process
and/or undertake complex or multiple tasks performance might diminish given the ﬁnite
cognitive resources available. One concept underpinning the Sardar case is the assumption
that jurors cannot attend to two forms of evidence effectively at the same time. Cognitive-
load theory states that constraints on working memory and information-processing systems
mean that humans have limited cognitive resources for performing tasks (Baddeley, 2003;
Sweller, 1988). Such a theory accounts for when carrying out complex tasks or multiple tasks
this can diminish performance given limited cognitive resources (Pashler, 1994; Wagstaff et
al., 2007; Wheatcroft & Ellison, 2012). Furthermore, some researchers have proposed that
individuals can be so limited at thinking and making inferences that mental shortcuts are
often taken; that is they are miserly in their thinking (Fiske, 1995). As a result individuals
under high cognitive-load may resort to heuristic processing and the use of cognitive short-
cuts to simplify processing conditions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), for example, when processing
two separate pieces of evidence. Although heuristics enhance the efﬁciency of everyday proc-
essing they may also increase the likelihood of biased judgements (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). In addition to cognitive-load, Sedikides and Skowronski’s (1991) “law
of cognitive structure activation” [i.e., that “stimuli will be encoded as an instance of the
structure that is most highly active in memory and the most semantically similar to the stim-
ulus” (p. 169)] and Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) “least effort principle” [i.e., that people have a
tendency to use the most convenient search methods when seeking information in the least
exacting way—stopping that search once an acceptable solution is found (for a review, see
also Chaiken & Trope, 1999) may also have relevance in this complex context]. Moreover, a
neuropsychological-cognitive model proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2007) suggests that techni-
cally difﬁcult tasks might be facilitated more readily if unnecessary cognitive burdens can be
reduced. Thus, Wagstaff et al.’s model helps to consider cognitive load relative to task difﬁ-
culty in this multifaceted domain, both tasks that are more and less complex (Wheatcroft &
Ellison, 2012).
There exists persuasive evidence in the literature to demonstrate juror performance suf-
fers under high cognitive-load. Psychological research into decision-making processes and
juror ability suggests that social-cognitive factors may be inﬂuential. Indeed, persuasive evi-
dence in the literature shows juror performance suffers under high cognitive load. For exam-
ple, jurors who must process greater amounts of information in a trial have been shown to
use heuristics, struggle to return appropriate verdicts, and even misinterpret evidence (Horo-
witz & Bordens, 2000; Horowitz, Bordens, Victor, Bourgeois, & ForsterLee, 2001; Horowitz,
ForsterLee, & Brolly, 1997; Tamborini, Huang, Mastro, & Nabashi-Nakahara, 2007).
Although one might argue these ﬁndings have limited ecological validity due to the use of
mock juror paradigms, research with actual jurors has yielded similar results, with juror con-
ﬁdence decreasing as the amount of information to be processed increases (Heuer & Penrod,
1994). It is also possible that jury members are likely to be inﬂuenced by group processes
activated during the deliberations that follow a trial. One inﬂuential theory of jury delibera-
tion places story making as a central feature. Pennington and Hastie’s (1991) story model
proposes that decision making by juries involves an active, constructive comprehension
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process in which information is molded into a coherent mental representation: the story
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The jury applies a “goodness of ﬁt” to the most acceptable ver-
sion using principles of coverage, coherence, and uniqueness. Taken together ﬁndings dem-
onstrate that jurors under high cognitive-load are more likely to be impaired in their ability
to systematically process information and reach unbiased decisions, and theories support
the contention that bias is likely to occur.
A number of other factors may also increase cognitive-load and affect juror performance.
Research has found that presentation of complex evidence triggers heuristic processing
(Bourgeois, Horowitz, & ForsterLee, 1993) causing jurors to assess witnesses using periph-
eral cues, such as gender or credentials (Cooper, Bennett, & Sukel, 1996; Schuller, Terry, &
McKimmie, 2005). Furthermore, that the imposition of two concurrent cognitively demand-
ing tasks increases jurors’ use of heuristics and disrupts information-processing (Kleider,
Knuycky, & Cavrak, 2012; Malavanti, 2012). Such disruption to processing may impact on
juror conﬁdence in own decision making. For example, Pennington and Hastie (1991) place
emphasis on mental representations (i.e., the structure and content of processed informa-
tion), and note that narratives are imposed on evidence (i.e., story model) as it is processed
by jurors making decisions. Those stories may be more or less structured, and thereby more
or less accessible, in ways that support more or less conﬁdence expressed by those making
assessments of the narrative, and which conﬁdence rating is dependent upon the type of evi-
dence medium used. The implication for the aforementioned legal case is that placing addi-
tional demands on jurors may have deleterious effects on their processing capabilities and
subsequent considerations, including potential impact on juror conﬁdence.
Clearly, features of a task affect how jurors process and use information. However,
evidence modality may also be relevant as auditory and visual information is processed
by separate memory subsystems (Baddeley, 2000). This means that more information can
be processed at once without causing cognitive overload if presented in a form which uti-
lizes both auditory and visual aspects, as each aspect is processed separately (Tindall-
Ford, Chandler, & Sweller, 1997). Indeed, research has revealed that presenting informa-
tion in multiple modalities reduces cognitive-load and improves recall compared to the
use of a single modality (Cao, Theune, & Nijholt, 2010; Penney, 1989). The modality of
evidence presentation may thus have implication for cognitive-load and hence how
important evidence might be processed.
Consistent with this approach are clear differences in how various modes of evidence
are perceived by jurors. There is some aged evidence to suggest that jurors ﬁnd tran-
script evidence less clear, more fatiguing, and more difﬁcult to attend to than video evi-
dence (Williams, Farmer, Lee, & Cundick, 1975). Findings accord with modality
explanation in the suggestion that processing transcript evidence, which uses only the
visual channel, is more cognitively taxing than video evidence - where processing
demands may be split across two channels. Moreover, these processing differences may
affect how the evidence itself is perceived. Str€omwall and Granhag (2002) found that
participants provided with video evidence rated a witness account as more consistent,
more complete, having greater logical structure, and containing richer detail than partic-
ipants provided with transcript evidence alone. Lindholm (2005) also noted that video
evidence yielded higher credibility ratings of a witness than transcript evidence. The
studies carry an implication that witness evidence might be received more positively
when presented in video form.
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However, the evidence is mixed. Pezdek, Avila-Mora and Sperry (2009) reported that wit-
ness evidence was rated less confusing, more informative, and more inﬂuential by jurors pre-
sented with a transcript compared to those assessing a video. Although this contradicts
previous ﬁndings, it nonetheless demonstrates a distinction in juror perceptions of evidence
presented in different forms. This may be partially attributed to cognitive-load; however, the
absence of demeanor cues in transcript evidence may also contribute to this effect. The
importance of demeanor will be covered in a later section.
Although adding additional modalities of evidence can help to relieve cognitive-load it
may result in the opposite outcome if high demands are placed on one processing channel.
In multimedia learning, the redundancy principle states that concurrently presenting indi-
viduals with graphics, audio narration and written text should be avoided as it can impair
information-processing (Clark & Mayer, 2011). In these cases the text is redundant as it
merely duplicates the spoken information, hence the visual channel is overloaded unneces-
sarily (Mayer, 2001). It is interesting to note that providing text is only recommended when
the audio information is hard to comprehend, mirroring the legal argument in the provision
of transcripts of video evidence (see R. v. Popescu, 2010).
The redundancy principle has received support from a number of studies. Homer, Blake,
and Plass (2008) identiﬁed that students who were given a video, audio track, and slides of a
lecture reported higher cognitive-load than those given only audio and slides suggesting
assessing multiple forms of the same information is cognitively demanding and may affect
information-processing. Indeed, a compelling body of research has demonstrated that learn-
ing is diminished in cases where redundant text is provided (Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller,
2004; Mayer, Heiser, & Lonn, 2001; Moreno & Mayer, 2002). At face value, these ﬁndings
further support the idea that including additional modes of visual information may prove
detrimental.
Regardless, as with other explanations, not all research has shown the same pattern of
results. Yadav et al. (2011) compared participants given narratives in text, video (including
visual and auditory elements), or video and text format. Surprisingly, participants were
more emotionally engaged with cases incorporating a video; yet, no differences in the cogni-
tive processing of the different presentation modes were found.
For the judiciary the balance of ﬁndings suggest that simultaneous presentation of witness
evidence to jurors in video and transcript form will lead to cognitive overload due to multi-
ple demands on the visual channel and may therefore affect how evidence is processed and
subsequent evaluations are made of witnesses by jurors. For example, high cognitive-load is
associated with the use of heuristics by jurors (Kleider et al., 2012) thus jurors may focus on
peripheral cues such as demeanor rather than systematically assessing testimony content. It
is here where the inconsistency between legal and psychological standpoints becomes appar-
ent; psychological literature suggests that jurors assessing multiple evidence forms will focus
more on demeanor, whereas the judiciary assert that jurors will ignore demeanor and focus
on the written word (R. v. Sardar, 2012). Such discrepancies highlight the need for empirical
investigation.
Despite the lack of clarity both disciplines seem to agree that jurors assessing multiple
forms of evidence will differ from jurors provided with a single form of evidence in how
much they attend to demeanor. Interestingly, the judiciary propose that the ability of
jurors to consider witness demeanor is a key component of the oral evidence system and
is essential for determining credibility (R. v. Sardar, 2012). Indeed, aspects of demeanor
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such as emotion, speaking style and eye gaze have all been shown to affect juror evalua-
tions of witnesses (Golding, Fryman, Marsil, & Yozwiak, 2003; Hemsley & Doob, 1978;
Ruva & Bryant, 2004); however, it should be noted that jurors often misinterpret the
meaning of nonverbal behaviors (Blumenthal, 1993). Nevertheless, differences in how
transcript and video forms of witness evidence are perceived (Lindholm, 2005) consoli-
date the view that cues of demeanor may well inﬂuence juror assessments. Thus, jurors
evaluating both video and transcript evidence will form different opinions of a witness
compared to jurors with only transcript or video evidence to consider. However, it is
currently unclear if this will be the result of an increased or decreased focus on
demeanor.
Various cases show the judiciary hold strong beliefs about the effects of providing
jurors with transcripts of video evidence (i.e., one should not do so without good cause);
yet, such assertions lack an evidential basis and may contradict some psychological
approaches to the matter. This study will therefore investigate the perceptions of jurors
when provided with simultaneous transcript and video evidence as opposed to video or
transcript evidence alone. Psychological literature suggests that the transcript may be a
redundant information source which requires additional cognitive resources for process-
ing, leaving fewer resources available for evidence evaluation. This may, in turn, affect
how jurors process and ultimately perceive witness evidence. A further line of inquiry
will explore the use of the judicial warning, currently used as a safeguard against bias,
when providing jurors with multiple evidence forms. In doing so, it will explore the
broader elements of cognition and the minutiae of evidence type and judicial warnings.
With these considerations in mind and in accounting for variability in research ﬁndings
the present study was designed to test some key hypotheses.
1. A judicial warning will encourage jurors to apply greater caution to assessments result-
ing in lower witness ratings across the range of measures.
2. Jurors presented with video and transcript evidence forms will make different assess-
ments of a witness, across the range of measures, compared to jurors presented with
video or transcript evidence alone.
3. Jurors assessing video and transcript (i.e., multiple) forms of evidence will be less conﬁ-
dent in their witness ratings across the range of measures.
4. a) Jurors will ﬁnd the assessment of the witness task more confusing, dependent upon
the evidence condition and the warning condition received, and, b) less clear, in light
of those conditions.
Method
Participants
Sixty jury eligible adult participants were recruited via a participation scheme, from the gen-
eral population, and across a range of occupations (51.7% were students). All participants
spoke English as a ﬁrst language. The sample size was deemed appropriate for the study con-
cerned and the analytic approach used. The overall sample consisted of 20 males and 40
females aged between 18 and 55 years (M D 28.65, SD D 11.96). No inducements were pro-
vided to the participants, apart from in the case of students, who received course credit for
experimental participation.
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Design
The study used a 3 (evidence type: transcript / video / transcript C video) x 2 (judicial warn-
ing: warning/no warning) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly allocated to
one of the conditions and assigned a participant number on arrival.
Materials
The stimuli used (i.e., video and transcript) was based on an adaptation of a real life interview
that had been conducted with a real witness and who had provided evidence during a real case.
The account was modiﬁed and anonymized to create a ten page verbatim interview transcript.
An actor (playing the witness who recounts her experience of discovering an injured neigh-
bour), thereby recreated the original transcript in video form. The thirteen minutes long video
stimulus was used as one condition or in another condition; to accompany the written witness
transcript, where appropriate in the design. The main body of the questionnaire consisted of
9-point Likert scales ranging from, for example, from 9 D “extremely conﬁdent” to 1 D repre-
senting “not at all conﬁdent.” A Likert scale was deemed appropriate as it has been rated the
easiest to use by respondents whilst also yielding adequate reliability and validity (Preston &
Colman, 2000). In this respect, Section 1 of the questionnaire assessed both global (e.g., satisfac-
tory and reliable) and more speciﬁc perceptions (e.g., accurate, clear, credible, intelligent, conﬁ-
dent, truthful, and likely to be lying) of witness performance, together with jurors’ own
conﬁdence in their assessments. In piloting the items two independent observers completed ten
witness ratings. Inter-rater reliability is employed to assess the extent to which different judges
or raters agree in their assessment decisions. It is particularly useful in this context where
human observers may not necessarily interpret answers the same way; that is, raters may
disagree as to how well certain responses or materials demonstrate the skill being assessed. The
inter-rater reliability was sufﬁcient to proceed with the main data collection (.762). Section 2
measured how clear and confusing the jurors found the task. Section 3 comprised several free
narrative questions where participants had the opportunity to provide more detailed informa-
tion about their experience of the task and factors which had inﬂuenced their judgements. These
aspects provided some additional information to the main analysis.
Procedure
Following allocation, participants were briefed as to the nature of the study (i.e., to contrib-
ute to understandings of the ways in which jurors might perceive evidence during court pro-
cesses). In doing so, participants read an information sheet and if each was happy to
continue provided consent prior to random assignment to one of the experimental condi-
tions. Participants were then informed that they would observe a video of a witness provid-
ing evidence before being asked to complete a questionnaire. Participants were randomly
allocated to one of the three conditions.
Before receiving the evidence, those in the “warning” conditions were verbally warned by
the researcher to: “Be aware of the danger of placing disproportionate weight on the evi-
dence, as opposed to your general impression and assessment of it.” The warning is one
guided by the Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Sardar (2012) in how judges may use a warn-
ing to provide guidance to jurors in the assessment of evidence. Participants were presented
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with the witness evidence for a total of thirteen minutes; either in transcript, video, or tran-
script C video form. After considering the evidence all participants completed the question-
naire which assessed personal perceptions of the witness and task.
On completion of the questionnaire, a debrief session took place where participants were
given the opportunity to ask questions about the research and thanked for their participa-
tion. Brieﬁng material adhered to British Psychological Society ethical principles relevant to
the research (2010); in particular, by informing participants that they could at any time ask
to withdraw either themselves or their data from the study.
Data Analysis
A series of 3 (evidence type: transcript/video/transcript plus video) x 2 (judicial warning: no
warning/warning) independent ANOVAs were conducted on the scores for witness satisfac-
tion, reliability, credibility, accuracy, clarity, intelligence, conﬁdence, truthfulness, and lying,
and juror conﬁdence, task clarity, and task confusion (see Tables 1 and 2).
Satisfactory Witness
There was no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54) D .03, h2 D .00, p > .05, or warning,
F(1,54) D .12, h2 D .00, p > .05, on how satisfactory the witness was rated by jurors. How-
ever there was an interaction between evidence type and warning, F(2,54) D 6.42, h2 D .19,
p < .01. Further investigation of this interaction revealed that in the video condition, jurors
Table 1. Mean averages and SDs for juror perception ratings X evidence type and judicial warning.
i. Evidence Type & Judicial Warning
Juror Perception Ratings
CONDITION
Evidence Type Judicial Warning
Witness
Satisfaction
Witness
Reliability
Witness
Credibility
Witness
Accuracy
Witness
Clarity
Witness
Intelligence
TRANSCRIPT No Warning 4.40 3.40 4.20 4.00 3.40 3.00
(1.35) (1.27) (1.40) (1.94) (2.27) (1.63)
Warning 4.60 3.60 3.80 4.40 4.40 4.40
(1.58) (1.35) (1.40) (1.35) (1.65) (1.65)
TOTAL 4.50 3.50 4.00 4.20 3.90 3.90
(1.70) (1.28) (1.38) (1.64) (2.00) (2.00)
VIDEO No Warning 3.60 2.60 4.00 3.40 3.60 3.60
(1.65) (1.27) (1.94) (1.84) (1.90) (1.90)
Warning 5.40y 4.40y 4.80 5.00 4.60 4.60
(1.27) (1.35) (1.48) (1.33) (2.07) (2.07)
TOTAL 4.50 3.50 4.40 4.20 4.10 4.10
(1.70) (1.57) (1.73) (1.77) (2.00) (2.00)
VIDEO C TRANSCRIPT No Warning 5.20 4.00 4.60 4.30 4.40 4.40
(1.75) (1.41) (1.27) (1.64) (2.50) (2.50)
Warning 3.60 3.40 4.40 3.80 4.20 4.20
(1.35) (1.27) (1.35) (1.40) (1.69) (1.69)
TOTAL 4.40 3.70 4.50 4.05 4.30 4.30
(1.73) (1.34) (1.28) (1.50) (2.08) (2.08)
TOTAL No Warning 4.40 3.33 4.27 3.90 3.90 3.80
(1.67) (1.40) (1.53) (1.79) (1.79) (2.20)
Warning 4.53 3.80 4.33 4.40 4.40 4.40
(1.55) (1.35) (1.42) (1.40) (1.40) (1.75)
TOTAL 4.47 3.57 4.30 4.15 4.15 4.10
(1.60) (1.39) (1.47) (1.61) (1.61) (2.00)
Standard deviations (SD) are shown in parenthesis.
p < .05; p < .02; p < .01; yp < .017
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given a warning (M D 5.40, SD D 1.27) rated the witness signiﬁcantly more satisfactory than
jurors without a warning (M D 3.60, SD D 1.65), t(18) D 2.74, p < .017. Additionally, when
a warning was provided, jurors evaluating transcript C video evidence (M D 3.60,
SD D 1.35) rated the witness less satisfactory than those using video evidence alone
(M D 5.40, SD D 1.27), t(18) D 3.08, p < .017. The results partially support H1. No other
comparisons reached signiﬁcance, p > .017.
Witness Reliability
No main effect of evidence type F(2,54) D .15, h2 D .01, p > .05, or warning, F(1,54) D 1.88,
h
2
D .03, p > .05, was observed for reliability ratings. Nevertheless an interaction between
evidence type and warning was identiﬁed, F(2,54) D 4.29, h2 D .14, p < .02. Post-hoc tests
revealed that within the video only condition, the witness was rated more reliable by jurors
given a warning (M D 4.40, SD D 1.35), than those without a warning (M D 2.60,
SD D 1.27), t(18) D 3.08, p < .017. The remaining comparisons were not signiﬁcant, p >
.017. The results partially support H1.
Witness Credibility
There was no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54) D .63, h2 D .02, p > .05, or warn-
ing, F(1,54) D .03, h2 D .00, p > .05, on juror ratings of witness credibility. No interac-
tion was present, F(2,54) D .93, h2 D .03, p > .05. The ﬁndings provide no support for
H1 and H2.
Table 2. Mean averages and sds for juror perception ratings x evidence type and judicial warning.
Evidence Type & Judicial Warning
Juror Perception Ratings
CONDITION
Evidence Type Judicial Warning
Witness
Conﬁdence
Witness
Truthfulness
Witness
Lying
Juror
Conﬁdence
Juror Task
Clarity
Juror Task
Confusion
TRANSCRIPT No Warning 3.00 (1.33) 6.20 (1.40) 2.60 (1.27) 5.40 (1.58) 7.40 (1.84) 3.00 (1.89)
Warning 2.80 6.00 3.40 5.60 6.80 2.00
(1.48) (1.41) (.84) (.97) (1.75) (1.05)
TOTAL 2.90 6.10 3.00 5.50 7.10 2.50
(1.37) (1.37) (1.12) (1.28) (1.77) (1.57)
VIDEO No Warning 3.60 6.00 2.80 5.20 7.00 3.20
(1.65) (1.94) (1.14) (1.99) (.94) (1.75)
Warning 4.80 6.20 3.60 4.60 5.80 3.60
(1.99) (1.40) (1.35) (1.27) (1.69) (1.35)
TOTAL 4.20 6.10 3.20 4.90 6.40 3.40
(1.88) (1.65) (1.28) (1.65) (1.47) (1.54)
VIDEO C TRANSCRIPT No Warning 5.20 5.80 4.20 5.20 7.60 2.20
(1.75) (1.69) (1.40) (1.14) (1.35) (1.03)
Warning 4.00 5.60 3.80 5.60 6.40 2.00
(1.05) (1.65) (1.03) (1.35) (1.35) (1.05)
TOTAL 4.60 5.70 4.00 5.40 7.00 2.10
(1.54) (1.63) (1.21) (1.23) (1.45) (1.02)
TOTAL No Warning 3.93 6.00 3.20 5.27 7.33 2.80
(1.80) (1.64) (1.42) (1.55) (1.40) (1.61)
Warning 3.87 5.93 3.60 5.27 6.33 2.53
(1.72) (1.46) (1.07) (1.26) (1.61) (1.36)
TOTAL 3.90 5.97 3.40 5.27 6.83 2.67
(1.74) (1.54) (1.27) (1.40) (1.58) (1.48)
Note. Standard deviations (SD) are shown in parenthesis.
 p < .05. p < .02. p < .01. yp < .017.
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Witness Accuracy
There was no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54)D .06, h2D .00, p> .05, or warning, F(1,54)
D 1.46, h2 D .03, p > .05, on perceived witness accuracy. The interaction was not signiﬁcant,
F(2,54)D 2.16, h2D .07, p> .05. Again, outcomes indicate no support for H1 and H2.
Witness Clarity
No main effect of evidence type, F(2,54)D .19, h2 D .01, p > .05, or warning, F(1,54)D 1.30,
h
2
D .02, p > .05, was observed for ratings of witness clarity. The interaction was not signiﬁ-
cant, F(2,54) D .58, h2 D .02, p > .05. The outcomes show no support for H1 and H2.
Witness Intelligence
There was no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54) D .56, h2 D .02, p > .05, or warning,
F(1,54) D .87, h2 D .02, p > .05, on ratings of witness intelligence. Although an interaction
between these factors was reported, F(2,54) D 3.48, h2 D .11, p < .05, post-hoc comparisons
were all found to be non-signiﬁcant at the prescribed level, p > .017. H1 and H2 are unsup-
ported in respect of this measure.
Witness Conﬁdence
A main effect of evidence type was observed for ratings of witness conﬁdence, F(2,54) D
6.41, h2 D .19, p < .01. Tukey comparisons showed that jurors in the transcript condition
(M D 2.90, SD D 1.37) rated the witness signiﬁcantly less conﬁdent than jurors in the video
(M D 4.20, SD D 1.88; p < .05) and transcript C video conditions (M D 4.60, SD D 1.54;
p < .01). Although the transcript C video condition yielded the highest conﬁdence rating,
the difference between the video only and transcript C video conditions was not signiﬁcant,
p > .05. There was no main effect of warning, F(1,54) D .03, h2 D .00, p > .05; though the
interaction showed a trend toward signiﬁcance F(2,54) D 2.95, h2 D .10, p D .06. The results
on this measure provide partial support for H2.
Witness Truthfulness
For ratings of truthfulness, no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54) D .42, h2 D .02, p > .05,
or warning, F(1,54) D .03, h2 D .00, p > .05, was observed. The interaction was non-signiﬁ-
cant, F(2,54) D .11, h2 D .00, p > .05. No indication of support for H1 and H2 is shown.
Witness Lying
A main effect of evidence type was identiﬁed for jurors’ ratings of the likelihood that the
witness was lying, F(2,54) D 3.98, h2 D .13, p < .05. Tukey comparisons revealed that jurors
in the transcript C video condition (M D 4.00, SD D 1.21) rated the witness more likely to
be lying than jurors in the transcript condition (M D 3.00, SD D 1.12), p < .05. There were
no signiﬁcant differences between the ratings of jurors in video and transcript C video
conditions or video only and transcript only conditions, p > .05. There was no main effect
of warning, F(1,54) D 1.71, h2 D .03, p > .05, or an interaction, F(2,54) D 1.71, h2 D .06,
p < .05. The results provide partial support for H2.
Juror Conﬁdence
There were no main effects of evidence type, F(2,54) D 1.03, h2 D .04, p > .05, or warning,
F(1,54) D .00, h2 D .00, p > .05, on jurors’ ratings of their own conﬁdence. The interaction
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was not signiﬁcant, F(2,54) D .70, h2 D .03, p > .05. The outcome on this measure provides
no support for H3.
Juror Task Clarity
There was no main effect of evidence type on how clear jurors rated the task, F(2,54) D 1.24,
h
2
D .04, p > .05. However a main effect of warning was observed, F(1,54) D 6.51, h2 D .11,
p < .02. This demonstrated that providing jurors with a warning (M D 6.33, SD D 1.61)
yielded lower ratings of task clarity than not presenting a warning (M D 7.33, SD D 1.40).
The interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(2,54) D .26, h2 D .01, p > .05. The results provide
partial support for H4.
Juror Task Confusion
A main effect of evidence type was detected for jurors’ ratings of how confusing the task was,
F(2,54) D 4.53, h2 D .14, p < .02. Tukey comparisons showed that the task was rated less
confusing when jurors were given both transcript C video evidence (M D 2.10, SD D 1.02),
compared to video evidence alone (M D 3.40, SD D 1.54), p < .02. None of the other com-
parisons differed signiﬁcantly, p > .05. There was no main effect of warning, F(1,54) D .55,
h
2
D .01, p > .05, or a signiﬁcant interaction, F(2,54) D 1.26, h2 D .05, p > .05. The results
provide partial support for H4.
Correlations
Pearson’s correlations were conducted on the data and those of relevance are reported. A
positive correlation was found between perceived conﬁdence and accuracy of the witness
(r D .138, p > .05) while a negative correlation existed the more conﬁdent the jurors the less
confusing they thought the task was (r D –.329, p < .02). However, juror ratings of how
confusing they found the task did not signiﬁcantly correlate with any of the witness ratings
(all p > .05).
Narratives
Table 3 demonstrates some of the key themes which emerged as being important for jurors’
assessments of the witness. Themes were determined using the Braun & Clarke (2006)
method. It is worthy of note that the number of jurors mentioning these elements appears to
be broadly similar across the different conditions. For brevity, only the experimental condi-
tions and themes of interest are reported here.
Discussion
The principal aim of the study was to examine judicial warnings as legal mechanisms
together with the effects of different evidence types on a range of juror assessments of a
witness. The potential for impact on jurors’ self-ratings in the assessment process was also
investigated. In summary, the ﬁrst hypothesis (i.e., that the provision of a warning would
encourage caution in juror assessments resulting in lower witness ratings), the second (i.e.,
that jurors presented with different evidence forms will make different witness assessments
across a range of measures), and fourth (i.e., that jurors will ﬁnd the assessment of the
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witness task more confusing and less clear), were all partially supported. These were depen-
dent upon the evidence condition and whether a warning was given or not. Broadly speak-
ing, the provision of the judicial warning resulted in juror ratings of the witness as more
satisfactory and reliable. Providing jurors with the warning also revealed lower ratings for
task clarity. In terms of evidence type, jurors provided with the transcript rated the witness
signiﬁcantly less conﬁdent. Furthermore, jurors assessing the witness using multiple evi-
dence forms rated the witness more likely to be lying. For jurors themselves, the task was
rated less confusing when both transcript and video were provided. The third hypothesis,
however, that jurors in assessing multiple forms of evidence will be less conﬁdent in their
ratings of the witness, was unsupported. We now turn our attention a more detailed consid-
eration of the ﬁndings.
Judicial Warning
The most striking ﬁnding was that when jurors were presented with a judicial warning the
witness was rated less satisfactory by the juror group considering both transcript C video
evidence compared to those with video evidence alone. This outcome lends partial support
to H1, and H2; that jurors who consider multiple evidence forms would rate witnesses differ-
ently from jurors who have access to a single form of evidence. The effect only occurred
when jurors were given the warning which suggests the judiciary is justiﬁed in concern of
cases where warnings are not provided to jurors due to the potential effect on how jurors
may perceive evidence. Further, as jurors who are permitted access to a transcript ought to
be provided with a warning, the ﬁnding that juror assessments are affected by the combina-
tion of a warning and multiple evidence forms is of great relevance for any legal system
which uses juries.
The literature which surrounds cognitive-load may extend an explanation of the ﬁnding
and of particular relevance are the ways in which information is managed. Theory suggests
that processing both transcript C video evidence places higher demands on jurors’ available
Table 3. Comparison across evidence types of examples which informed juror evaluations.
Evidence Type Type of Data Nonverbal Assessments of Witness Assessments of Testimony Consistency
Video No. of Jurors 7 6
Examples “body language & tone of voice” “she repeated the same statements”
“her appearance makes her look as
though she is an honest person”
“several key points repeated accurately, so
probably true”
“how well the witness was presented,
body language”
“she stuck to her story despite persistent
questioning so I thought she was
somewhat reliable”
“the way she was speaking” “her story stayed consistent”
“body language - yawning, playing
with hair”
Transcript C Video No. of Jurors 8 7
Examples “her posture, body language” “repetition of key factors”
“witness looked clear, tidy, made up
and attractive”
“how consistent answers were”
“the way the witness spoke” “the witness gave consistent evidence”
“the manner in which questions were
answered”
“the solid story she provided”
“body language of the witness
suggested she felt uncomfortable”
“repetition seemed to make answers more
believable”
“tone of voice, body language,
stuttering”
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cognitive resources (Mayer, 2001); a problem which may have been exacerbated in this case
by the additional processing requirements of a warning placed upon assessors. Wagstaff et
al.’s (2007) cognitive neuropsychological theory of facilitation and inhibition suggests that
more complex tasks require greater cognitive effort and thereby activate executive and
frontal systems with potential to err as a result of lowered processing capacity. Moreover,
inhibition of more appropriate outcomes may also be inﬂuenced and result in defaults to
more autonomic responses that require little in the way of cognitive work (Fiske, 1995).
Those undertaking processing of both transcript C video evidence thus likely need to work
much harder minimizing the ability to “free up” capacity in the brain to process information.
Either that, or individuals may be miserly in their thinking (Fiske, 1995).
Indeed research tells us that simultaneously performing two tasks impairs jurors’
information-processing and encourages heuristic processing (Kleider et al., 2012; Malavanti,
2012). Therefore, the processing strategies of jurors assessing multiple evidence forms
together with a warning may have been similarly affected. For example, jurors could heuristi-
cally rate the witness as less satisfactory due to the demands inherent within the task. In the
complex context of the courtroom, mental shortcuts, which can often help to streamline
information in daily activities, can be detrimental and lead to less effective outcomes
(Wheatcroft & Ellison, 2012). Notwithstanding the replication of this ﬁnding, it has practical
implications for the legal system. Jurors’ rating of how satisfactory they believe witnesses to
be is a more global assessment of the witness. Thus, judicial bodies may be right to avoid
providing transcripts to jurors when making such appraisals. This is of particular
signiﬁcance given that jurors in the courtroom are encouraged to form general (i.e., more
global) opinions of witnesses (R. v. Sardar, 2012).
Further evidence that the provision of a warning affected global ratings of the witness was
found within the video condition. Jurors given the warning rated the witness as more satis-
factory and reliable than those who did not consider a warning. This outcome contradicts
the Hypothesis 1 that the warning would encourage caution in juror assessments, resulting
in lower witness ratings. Moreover, it does not support studies that have shown that warn-
ings make jurors more skeptical of all witnesses (Greene, 1988; Katzev & Wishart, 1985).
Instead, it seems the warning might have been successful in directing jurors to develop an
overall impression of the witness. According to Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) people tend to
use the most convenient search methods when seeking information and stopping that search
once a solution is found that is acceptable. In mental shortcut terms the warning then has
acted as a signal to directing attention helping in the increased access to resources that
appears to have helped jurors cognitively process information more readily without poten-
tially overloading central and frontal mechanisms. Taken together, the warning given yielded
more positive witness ratings despite the fact it reminded jurors to be cautious in making
assessments. Overall, this might be thought of as a reassuring result as judicial warnings that
simply make jurors skeptical of all witnesses may serve to unfairly disadvantage reliable wit-
nesses (Paterson et al., 2013). Furthermore, the ﬁndings reiterate the importance of provid-
ing a warning to jurors even when video evidence is presented alone. On the face of it, in the
current case, not presenting a warning would have been detrimental in terms of how reliable
and satisfactory jurors rated the witness. Such an outcome thereby supports the judicial posi-
tion on the importance of legal warnings and the relevance of their application. Plus, as the
warning appears to affect global, rather than speciﬁc, evaluations of the witness it may be
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useful to develop judicial warnings to encourage jurors to consider how satisfactory and
reliable they ﬁnd the witness.
In addition, mock jurors rated the task less clear when a warning was provided for consid-
eration and accords with existing literature which has demonstrated jurors often struggle to
comprehend judicial warnings (Rose & Ogloff, 2001; Thomas, 2010), providing some
support for Hypothesis 4. Again, as noted earlier, both process and application of a warning
is intuitively complex and thereby cognitively demanding (Wagstaff et al., 2007). Although
warnings are an essential part of legal proceedings the ﬁndings here show the judiciary must
remain cautious in the presentation of warnings as it is clear how the task is perceived by
jurors could lead to heuristics being applied to the processing task. As a result, the enhance-
ment of judicial warnings to minimize the imposition of cognitive load must be researched
in greater detail. In doing so, one may also draw upon the recommendation made to direct
jurors towards assessments of satisfaction and reliability.
Furthermore, the constitution of the jury is such that other factors, such as the age,
gender, ethnicity, attractiveness, or even the reputation of the judge may have a role to play.
However, the inclusion of these elements was beyond the scope of this study. What can be
said is that as the judicial direction is toward jurors it is less likely the reputation of the judge
would be known to those lay persons in the court. Investigation into the relevance of age,
gender, ethnicity, and attractiveness however may well make for interesting ﬁndings.
We turn our attention to those ﬁndings that relate to evidence type.
Evidence Type: Video, Transcript, and Video Plus Transcript
The second key area of interest was the consideration of the effects of providing jurors with
multiple forms of evidence. Although transcript C video evidence affected global assess-
ments of the witness when accompanied by a judicial warning many of the hypothesized
differences between transcript C video evidence and other evidence types failed to emerge
for speciﬁc assessments of witness performance.
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, juror ratings of how accurate, clear, credible, truthful, and
intelligent the witness did not differ signiﬁcantly across the various evidence conditions.
Unlike research from other contexts, which has demonstrated multiple forms of information
placed a greater cognitive-load on participants (Homer et al., 2008), this was not found here.
The reasons for this cannot be established; however, it may indicate that jurors made efforts
to attend to the particular form, and in doing so, narrowed the search for evidence to apply
their ratings. Moreover, there may be limitations in comparing a student to a juror, as, in
the case of a student one requires a certain amount of cognitive need to learn whereas in the
case of assessing a witness a juror’s cognitive capabilities are based on central or peripheral
abilities together with motivation to process the information. This could well form the basis
for further empirical investigation to provide a meaningful comparison.
Although the ﬁndings do not support literature which has identiﬁed differences in jurors’
credibility ratings of transcript C video evidence (Lindholm, 2005) it is consistent with
researchers who have found no differences in the cognitive-processing of narratives pre-
sented in different forms (Yadav et al., 2011). The contradictions illustrate the complexities
involved in research of this kind; that the ﬁndings in this ﬁeld can be mixed and that cogni-
tive-load explanations may not necessarily be applicable to, or across, all contexts. Indeed,
the skills individual jurors bring to dealing with cognitive loads may well be differential and
is a clear area of expansion which requires further research.
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Nevertheless, the most noteworthy point is that supplying a transcript alongside video
evidence did not affect jurors’ speciﬁc ratings of the witness. Judicial concern about the
provision of additional transcript evidence is mitigated for speciﬁc witness assessments.
Nonetheless, jurors tend not to make speciﬁc assessments of witnesses but instead evaluate
them in a global, more general, fashion. Given this, any tendency to recommendation against
additional transcript evidence would remain valid.
Drawing upon comments made by jurors in the free narrative section of the question-
naire appeared to support the ﬁnding that juror perceptions of video and transcript C
video evidence were not as different as expected. Two main ideas appeared to inform
juror assessments; these were “consistency of witness testimony” (e.g., how well the wit-
ness restated and repeated key information) and “non-verbal factors” (e.g., body lan-
guage, appearance, tone of voice). The comments accord with research that reports that
testimony consistency and witness demeanor inﬂuence juror evaluations (Berman &
Cutler, 1996; Ruva & Bryant, 2004). Most importantly, the number of jurors comment-
ing on these factors was similar across video and transcript C video conditions suggest-
ing the presentation of multiple evidence forms did not differentially affect the types of
cues attended to by jurors. Furthermore, that juror’s in the transcript C video condition
made reference to nonverbal factors indicates these jurors did not necessarily, as the
judiciary suggest, apply more consideration to the written transcript. While encouraging
from a legal standpoint it is important to acknowledge that witness demeanor can be
misleading as jurors often hold inaccurate beliefs about the meaning of non-verbal
behaviors (Blumenthal, 1993). The judiciary should therefore be mindful of the potential
limitations of judgements based on demeanor cues. Nevertheless only a small number of
jurors in each condition identiﬁed demeanor as inﬂuential in their assessments which
suggests mock jurors in this study attended to a number of different factors rather than
appraising nonverbal factors alone. Taken together, it seems jurors assessing multiple
evidence forms based their assessments on the same factors as jurors evaluating only
video evidence.
Even when an effect of evidence type was observed for speciﬁc witness evaluations, differ-
ences were not detected between the video and transcript C video conditions. Jurors rated
the witness as more likely to be lying when presented with transcript C video evidence, as
opposed to transcript evidence alone. Such a ﬁnding offers partial support for Hypothesis 2
as it demonstrates that juror ratings did vary across evidence conditions - albeit not for the
conditions necessarily of interest to the judiciary. While this may indicate that jurors assess-
ing transcript C video evidence were able to attend to cues beyond the transcript the rele-
vance of the ﬁnding is largely limited; given that transcripts alone do not tend to be used as
the sole method of witness evidence presentation in court, notwithstanding certain witnesses
who may be classed vulnerable. The important outcome was that jurors in the video and
transcript C video conditions did not differ in their perceptions that the witness was lying—
adding to the notion that providing transcripts alongside video evidence does not affect
more speciﬁc ratings.
Similarly, transcript evidence yielded lower ratings of witness conﬁdence than video or
transcript C video evidence. The ratings of transcript C video evidence differed from tran-
script, but not video evidence. This may well indicate it was important for jurors to be able
to visually assess the witness as jurors with only written information returned lower ratings
of witness conﬁdence. Importantly, for judiciaries, juror ratings of witness conﬁdence were
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consistent across video and transcript C video conditions. The outcome contributes to the
idea that speciﬁc assessments of the witness remain unaffected by the conditions presented
here. With regard to the relationship between conﬁdence and accuracy, no correlation was
observed between perceived conﬁdence and accuracy of the witness (.138). Interestingly, this
contradicts research which has shown jurors often judge more conﬁdent witnesses as more
accurate (Brigham, 1990; Penrod & Cutler, 1995). In context, this could be viewed positively
given that the most conﬁdent witness is not necessarily the most accurate (Wheatcroft &
Woods, 2010).
The study also explored the impact of evidence type on jurors’ own conﬁdence in rat-
ings made and found the method of evidence presentation had no effect on juror conﬁ-
dence. This contradicts the prediction that jurors assessing multiple evidence forms
would be less conﬁdent in own assessments (Hypothesis 3) and does not necessarily
support previous literature (Heuer & Penrod, 1994). It is nevertheless encouraging that
juror conﬁdence remained stable across all evidence conditions as overconﬁdence has
been associated with inaccurate responses in previous research (Wheatcroft, Wagstaff &
Kebbell, 2004). Neither did the addition of a transcript adversely increase or decrease
juror conﬁdence. An interesting ﬁnding was that the more conﬁdent jurors were, the
less confusing they rated the task (r D –.329); so, those who were higher in conﬁdence
seem, overall, less affected by task complexity. In sum, although the provision of tran-
script evidence has other detrimental effects, it does not appear to manipulate juror
conﬁdence.
Turning to jurors’ perceptions of the task itself, the Hypothesis 4 that multiple evidence
forms would make the task more confusing and less clear was partially supported. While
evidence type had no impact on jurors’ perceptions of task clarity, jurors rated the task as
less confusing when assessing both transcript C video evidence, compared to video evidence
alone. Consistent with this, several jurors reported that the transcript C video were “helpful
when combined” and “helped to understand the evidence of the witness much more easily.”
Although these comments provide an interesting insight they cannot be considered repre-
sentative of the experiences of all mock participants, nor indeed all jurors. Furthermore, this
outcome does not undermine the recommendation that transcript C video evidence should
not be presented to jurors, as it is relevant only to jurors’ own perceptions of the task, rather
than appraisals made of the witness.
On balance, it appears that differences in jurors’ perceptions of the task did not
translate into differences in ratings of the witness as no differences between evidence
conditions for speciﬁc assessments of witness performance were found. Furthermore,
jurors’ ratings of how confusing they found the task did not correlate with any of the
witness ratings (p > .05). In contrast to studies which have demonstrated jurors are
often inﬂuenced by psychological factors, such as emotions and attitudes (Bornstein,
1998; Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989), these ﬁndings suggest jurors were able to sepa-
rate feelings about the task from perceptions of the witness. Thus jurors may be better
equipped to perform the role than some research has previously suggested. Of course,
no research is without its limitations. First, the sample may not have been representa-
tive of the general jury-eligible population due to the prevalence of student participants,
which may limit the generalizability of ﬁndings. Thus, the sample size may be a limita-
tion which could have impacted upon the statistical power of the study. Nevertheless,
the outcomes may have been enhanced had a larger sample been available. Second, the
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study lacks some ecological validity, particularly as jurors only assessed evidence of a
single witness. In reality, a feature of real trials is that jurors would be required to
assess evidence across multiple witnesses. The research would beneﬁt from investigating
this factor, bearing in mind witnesses in actual trials will be dependent upon judges
and magistrates exercising vigilance and intervening on rule of law where appropriate.
Jurors were also required to make their judgements in isolation, which neither reﬂects
the true experience of jurors nor provides insight into the effects of multiple evidence
forms on juror deliberation. Having said this, Meyers, Brashers, and Hanner (2000)
observed in mock juries that the position favored prior to group discussion becomes
the ﬁnal verdict approximately 90% of the time.
On the question of method, obviously the experimental design used here cannot reﬂect
the full range of variables present in a real trial situation. Nevertheless, it could be argued
that ecological validity was enhanced by (a) the use of a real case transcript and (b) the
use of an actress in the witness video condition, to reﬂect more accurately the way in
which information is presented. On the other hand, real testimony does have important
consequences. At the same time, the real trial context could exaggerate the ﬁndings of
this study, with jurors ﬁnding greater difﬁculty in their comprehension of questions as a
result of the greater cognitive burdens alluded to above. Future research should neverthe-
less seek to address these issues and explore whether the ﬁndings can be replicated using
a more representative sample and in conditions, where possible, of greater ecological
validity. Research may also be advised to investigate the validity of demeanor cues for
jurors’ assessments of witnesses with particular reference to the global-speciﬁc dimension
identiﬁed in this paper.
Conclusion
The study showed mock jurors’ global assessments of a witness were signiﬁcantly affected
by the presentation of transcript C video evidence in conjunction with a judicial warn-
ing. Conversely, speciﬁc assessments of the witness and task were unaffected by the addi-
tion of a transcript; however, this is perhaps less important given that jurors tend to, and
are directed to, make global appraisals of witnesses. Taken together, the ﬁndings provide
some empirical support for the judiciary’s leaning toward the opposition of transcript
use and the assertion in R. v. Sardar (2012) that there were “serious errors both in letting
the jury see the transcript … and in failing to direct to them as to the dangers of giving
disproportionate weight to the transcript” (p. 4). Notwithstanding replication of these
outcomes it seems that jurors who must assess witnesses in a global fashion ought not to
be provided with the accompanying transcript. Findings also emphasize the importance
of providing jurors with a warning should video evidence be presented alone. Finally, the
judiciary might develop warnings to encourage jurors to consider how satisfactory and/
or reliable they ﬁnd witnesses.
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